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ABSTRACT 
Recent Supreme Court cases have entrenched a new image of cor-
porate civic identity, assigning to the corporate person rights and abilities 
based upon the cultural characteristics, social ties, civic commitments, 
and internal lives of the human beings involved in it. This vision of the 
corporation is exemplified in recent cases implicating a corporate right to 
engage in political speech (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion) and a right of corporations to be free of government interference 
regarding religious convictions (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.). 
Although much is being written about the soundness of the results in the-
se cases and potential inconsistencies of the legal analysis that led to the-
se results, this Article uses these cases to introduce a normatively potent 
theoretical perspective on corporate law that has for too long been exiled 
to the periphery of legal theorizing. When persons, whether corporate or 
human, interact within a social system, social theories of culture—not 
just microeconomic theories of individual incentives or ethical theories 
of individual duty—are required to fully understand the rights, norms, 
behaviors, and duties of such persons. The law has transformed the cor-
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poration into a unique civic person capable of holding and expressing 
opinions and beliefs to other members of its social community. This de-
velopment urgently demands that corporate law scholars take cultural 
theory seriously if they are to fully understand the rights, norms, behav-
iors, and duties of modern corporations. This Article makes the case for 
the increased centrality of cultural theory within corporate law and lays 
out some of the major challenges and implications that lie ahead as this 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans only casually informed about the workings of the 
law were surprised to learn in early 2010 that corporations had suddenly 
grown inner lives. The Supreme Court, with its ruling in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, seemingly endowed firms with the abil-
ity to possess political opinions.1 In truth, American legal doctrine has 
long held that corporations have the potential for political speech.2 Rely-
ing heavily upon a characterization of the purpose of First Amendment 
political speech protections to be the safeguard of the right of listeners to 
hear as many different viewpoints as possible, the Court rendered protec-
tions for corporate political speech rights practically indistinguishable 
                                                 
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976). 
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from those for human persons.3 Citizens United garnered immediate and 
dramatic backlash for its blurring in law of socially important distinc-
tions between human beings and corporations. 
The courts, however, have continued to move in this direction. Four 
years after Citizens United, the Fourth Circuit decided that corporations 
could claim racial identities.4 The court’s opinion in Carnell Construc-
tion v. Danville replicated the High Court’s blurring of the distinctions 
between human and corporate rights.5 The Fourth Circuit mimicked the 
High Court in taking as settled the nature and extent of rights for corpo-
rations based in personal attributes—personal rights, let us call them6—
and added a slight but important turn. In Carnell, an “imputed right” of a 
corporation to pursue an action on behalf of shareholders who had been 
discriminated against—established in the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits7—became an ability to be the “direct object” of discrimination.8 
Then, with the June 2014 Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court in-
formed the nation that corporations have the ability to practice religion.9 
These decisions seem to be peculiarly culturally inflected: they de-
scribe interior lives emergent—and inextricable—from social contexts. 
One might even call this an anthropological moment in corporate law 
jurisprudence. Legal anthropologists (myself among them) have found 
themselves caught between feelings of dismay over how corporate power 
has been conceptualized in the absence of a social theory for how these 
emergent persons should be free to behave vis-à-vis their surrounding 
communities, and excitement about the potential for a newly energized 
synergy between anthropological and legal takes on the corporation. 
This Article advances the following thesis: The newly gained “ma-
turity” of the corporate persons in our midst requires corporate law 
scholars to take seriously a concept they have long held at arm’s length, 
namely, culture. Legal scholars have tended to prefer to elide cultural 
                                                 
 3. See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 360–70; see also infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 4. Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. While Citizens United focused on the rights of the audience to hear the expression of speak-
ers, expression is at its roots about personal attributes: at the very least, intellect and conscience. Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 7. See Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005); Thinket Ink Info. 
Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. 
Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 882 (8th Cir. 2003); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., 
Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2002) (imputed racial identity). See generally Richard R.W. 
Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023 (2006). 
 8. Carnell, 745 F.3d at 715. 
 9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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considerations because culture is so deeply complex, contingent, and re-
sistant to the legal method of neat doctrinal analysis. Yet this phenome-
non is precisely what must be considered if the law is to conceptualize 
corporations in a way that adequately respects important human interests 
and social values. And it is precisely the phenomenon that the discipline 
of cultural anthropology takes as its field of study. 
The cases outlined in this Article evidence the courts’ increasing 
willingness to conflate corporate rights and the rights of human beings, 
as well as their failure to articulate any clear picture of the contexts or the 
characteristics of corporations that might trigger or limit such rights. 
Without some theory of how these entities can or ought to interact with 
social norms, patterns of conduct, implicit constraints on the exercise of 
power, or societal wells of meaning, corporate law will cease to be con-
nected to social reality. The recent financial crisis served as a confirma-
tion of the notion that the world is messy and complex in ways that con-
found traditional, economically-focused perspectives. In response, econ-
omists and legal scholars are taking up new methods to preserve this 
messiness in their analysis in order to better understand what is happen-
ing in the world around them. The dominance of law-and-economics 
stances in corporate law has begun to yield to a diverse set of approaches 
that recognize the importance of culture. Cases like Citizens United, 
Carnell, and Hobby Lobby are producing novel questions to consider 
with these new techniques. The effort to incorporate anthropological the-
ories of culture into our understanding of the corporation is now a matter 
of urgent interest. 
As this Article will show, there are two primary reasons for this ur-
gency. First, whether corporations are viewed as entities or as collections 
of individuals, their rights cannot be understood without a careful analy-
sis of the corporation’s social and contextual particulars. Scholars have 
tended to focus more on the connections between, and characteristics of, 
people within the corporation—hence the large literatures on corporate 
culture as a management and productivity variable.10 But corporations 
also spring from, and necessarily act upon, the cultural and legal norms 
that surround them. Second, once the study of the interaction between 
corporate persons and their cultural underpinnings comes into focus, a 
set of normatively important and challenging questions can be asked. For 
example, what influence should these cultural milieux have on the law? 
What limitations and exhortations should the law place upon them? How 
                                                 
 10. See Langevoort infra note 21. 
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should the cultural person of the corporation be related to its legal per-
sonhood? 
An anthropological approach offers two tools that we might employ 
in answering such questions—one theoretical and the other methodologi-
cal. Anthropology employs the concept of culture as a theoretical tool: as 
one lens through which to understand the world. Other approaches have 
other theoretical tools, their own lenses; economists, for example, may 
privilege efficiency or the maximization of human welfare as a norm—
efficiency becomes their lens, something that matters in a way that can 
tell us something interesting about the world. Understanding the world 
through the lens of culture allows anthropologists to analyze complexi-
ties of human communal behavior otherwise hidden from view. Cultural 
anthropology gets at these complexities by means of a second tool—a 
distinct empirical method, that of ethnographic analysis.11 My work uses 
what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz called “thick description” to in-
vestigate relational aspects of corporate behavior.12 Thick description 
requires an intense attention to the context of human behavior in seeking 
to understand its significance to actors and interpret its meaning.13 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I compare the ways in 
which the concept of culture is used in legal scholarship and anthropolo-
gy regarding the corporate person. Once legal theorists of the corporation 
take culture seriously, we may recognize the importance of taking cultur-
al considerations into account in theorizing what the corporation is and 
ought to be. The nature of the corporation (its essence, who owns it, from 
whom it gets the characteristics we are reading into it) and the relation-
ships between the corporation and whatever is outside it become essen-
tial considerations. Thus, although it seems obvious that cases regarding 
                                                 
 11. Anthropological ethnographic analysis focuses particularly upon long-term, in-depth quali-
tative study of some social grouping or phenomenon with an eye to understanding its dynamics. 
Studies will tend to be holistic and to involve many months of engagement with the group or phe-
nomenon in question, often including interaction with people as they go about their lives. 
 12. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5–6, 9–10 (1973). 
 13. The focus throughout the Article will be upon describing the processes and discourses by 
which outcomes are produced—upon making visible what, following Rosemary Coombe, I will call 
the cultural logic of corporate law, as it is expressed in these cases. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Cul-
ture: Anthropology’s Old Vice or International Law’s New Virtue?, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
261, 263 (1999) (describing the “cultural logic of intellectual property law”). For commentaries 
arguing the cultural nature of corporate law specifically, see Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Cor-
porations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (2000) (“[C]orporation law—like any other branch of law—grows out of a 
specific cultural tradition and intellectual history.”). For two classic overviews of the connections 
between law and culture, see generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS 
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 
(2006). 
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race or the exercise of religion might be described as “cultural,” subtler 
and far more significant is the manner in which the courts take into ac-
count—or do not take into account—the forces and frictions, internal and 
external, that make up the corporation. 
In Part II, I use this anthropological idea of culture to analyze 
changes to the jurisprudence of corporations signaled by Citizens United, 
Carnell, and Hobby Lobby.14 These recent cases exemplify a vision of 
the corporation deriving socially oriented characteristics from its associ-
ated individuals. The corporation gains these characteristics from what 
looks like nothing so much as the “magical contagion” described in clas-
sical anthropology.15 I thus call this image of the nature of corporate 
rights the contingent corporation. The corporation-as-entity thus comes 
to be assigned the characteristics, social ties, civic commitments, and 
internal lives of the aggregate of humans involved with it. Importantly, 
this is not an entirely new image of the corporation. I review the similari-
ties between the contingent corporation and the socially entangled corpo-
ratist bureaucracies of Émile Durkheim and Adolf Berle. Taking their 
work as a foil to the current moment in corporate theory, I historicize the 
corporation as a rights-holding entity in the eyes of the law in ways that 
have changed as society has. I use Citizens United, Carnell, and Hobby 
Lobby as examples that demonstrate how the concept of the corporation 
lends itself both to a salutary elasticity and toward particular conceptions 
of its place in society. 
In Part III, I discuss the normative implications and theoretical 
challenges of using the lens of culture to examine corporate law and 
practice. To bring into view the types of insights to be gained from ap-
plying this cultural lens, I use an example from the long-term fieldwork I 
conducted with a New Zealand corporation owned by Māori people.16 
                                                 
 14. Stephen Bainbridge cautions us to consider that perhaps the Supreme Court entirely lacks 
any such coherent corporate law jurisprudence. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Corporations Have 
No Right Under FOIA to “Personal Privacy,” PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 1, 2011, 12:09 
PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/03/corporations-have-no-
right-under-foia-to-personal-privacy.html; Stephen Bainbridge, The Constitutional Rights of Corpo-
rations, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 29, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://www.professor 
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/09/the-constitutional-rights-of-corporations.html. 
15. See JAMES FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH (1890). 
 16. An important caveat: That I use this ethnographic data is not to claim that “Māori culture” 
or “indigenous culture” as totalizing wholes provide some example upon which American corporate 
law scholars might seize in order to improve American corporate law. The trope of an “indigenous 
wisdom” that might be used to help nonindigenous people (not, of course, the indigenous people), 
the trope of a “naturally” and homogenously more environmentally responsible indigenous “cul-
ture,” and the trope of “a” culture as something indigenous people have (that naturally directs their 
actions) as opposed to “rational” nonindigenous people, are all problematic and often incredibly 
destructive tropes. Indeed, they are some of the ideas that have necessitated an ongoing project of 
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Although an indigenously owned company may seem a far cry from the 
firms at issue in Citizens United, Carnell, and Hobby Lobby, there are 
surprising parallels. Further, the kind of culturally-sensitive, ethnograph-
ic research I conducted is quite close to the kinds of factual questions the 
Supreme Court would have us ask of corporations who seek to assert 
such things as religious beliefs on members of their communities, such as 
employees and their families. 
The Article then offers a conclusion and lays out the work ahead as 
scholars begin the work of applying anthropologically informed cultural 
theory and research methods to help fill out the rights and duties of cor-
porate persons.17 
I. WHY RETHINKING CULTURE MATTERS 
In this Part of the Article, I sketch the genealogy of the concept of 
culture in legal scholarship on corporations, contrasting this with the de-
velopment of the same concept in anthropology. I elaborate my stance on 
the importance of a modern anthropological concept of culture in the le-
gal theorization of the rights attaching to the corporation. 
For legal scholars of corporate law, the concept of culture has been 
an interesting but peripheral one.18 Of course, there has been some fine 
work done regarding corporations and culture. While acknowledging the 
                                                                                                             
rethinking of the culture concept within the discipline of anthropology. See Coombe, supra note 13. 
As my explication of the concept in the next Part should make clear, these tropes are not what I 
mean by “culture,” and this is not how I hope my examples will be received. A bounded “Māori 
culture” or “indigenous culture” is not the key here—it is the interactions between these people and 
these particular laws and this political moment. None of these may be unproblematically lifted 
wholesale to another context. Instead, I entreat you to pay attention to the interactions, the processes 
at work. The takeaway point is not about the uptake of notions of “indigenous wisdom” but about the 
ways state regulation and intragroup norms may be seen to give rise to, and reinforce, expectations 
for socially-oriented corporate behavior. 
 17. While the corporation comes in forms many and varied, I focus here specifically upon the 
for-profit business corporation. 
 18. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in 
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1459 (2005); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 
23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479 (1997); Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Cul-
ture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 229 (2005); Diane Vaughan, 
Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377 (1982); Diane 
Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 23 (1998). There has also been some nifty law and society work holding culture to more 
sustained attention. See, e.g., John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corpo-
rate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 
(1997) (using anthropological methods to query the concept of corporate misconduct in three case 
studies); Stewart Macaulay, Crime and Custom in Business Society, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 248 (1995) 
(classic legal ethnography by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski highly influential for Macau-
lay’s study on the contract behavior of business people). 
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concept’s unwieldiness—the complexity that makes it both useful and 
difficult to use in legal analysis—some scholars have approached culture 
as something still interesting to, and even necessary for, law and eco-
nomics. Robert Ellickson, for example, espouses a self-aware, sociology-
tinted19 theory of culture that he accedes may “rest[] on simplifying as-
sumptions” but nonetheless is worth considering.20 Donald Langevoort, 
also working to pin down the nature of culture in the context of the law 
and economics of corporations, has noted that while the concept is im-
portant for economic analysis, its “fuzzy” nature makes its proper place 
within law and economics scholarship difficult to discern: “One of the 
main objections to invoking corporate culture in rigorous legal analysis is 
that there is no clear definition of corporate culture.”21 
For the most part the question in this situation has been: how can 
we make use of culture? In turn, the answer has tended to be: only tan-
gentially—and only if we can define it and schematize it so that we are 
certain we know its meaning. The difficulty in pinpointing the meaning 
of culture has made cultural analysis challenging to deploy in corporate 
law scholarship. Compared to the streamlined elegance of law and eco-
nomics, sophisticated cultural analysis—with all its unwieldiness and 
tendency to resist schematization—has had seemingly little to contribute. 
For the most part, on occasions where and when culture is taken into ac-
count in law and economics, it has tended to be addressed as a problem, a 
spanner in the works that must be made amenable to schematization and 
modeling.22 
                                                 
 19. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of 
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, The Evo-
lution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy (Yale Law Sch., Program for Studies 
in Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 230, 1999) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=191392; Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for 
Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001). 
 20. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 19, at 4. 
 21. Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture” in Law and Eco-
nomics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80, 81 (2006). 
 22. Mark Roe, for example, aims to address the cultural complexities that tended to be ignored 
in modeling, and examines the ways in which this gaggle of complexities might limit the 
contractarian model of the corporation. Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of 
Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2002). He concludes that it might, but only slight-
ly. Id. at 1257. Nonetheless, Roe acknowledges that cultural background, while a variable ignored by 
most law and economics models, might be important in ways perhaps now invisible. Roe tests this 
supposition by means of a comparative sketch of takeover law—but culture does not erode the mod-
el only at its outer edges. A thicker concept of culture limits the contractarian model in different 
ways than does the concept as sketched by Roe. For instance, in his discussion of takeovers, Roe 
mentions in a brief aside—as an example of phenomena different from culture that might “also” 
constrain the economic model—the way legislatures act regarding impediments to takeovers, the 
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There are several entirely distinct concepts of corporate culture, alt-
hough their species-differences are seldom articulated. For example, the 
concept’s most commonplace manifestation might be described as pop 
corporate culture—a concept notable for the practical uses to which it 
can be put, perhaps by managers seeking to shape corporate behavior and 
productivity or job seekers looking to increase their appeal to such man-
agers. Legal literatures of corporate culture draw upon articulations of 
the nature of culture espoused within any of several disciplinary 
strains—for example, economics, organizational studies, or business eth-
ics.23 Approaches influenced by economics or by organizational studies 
might query the way that people use or can use the concept of culture to 
improve business outcomes,24 while business ethicists might focus upon 
the extent to which cultural characteristics impact ethical reasoning and 
behavior.25 There is, of course, no “one true culture concept” and no one 
way to think about or use any version of the concept, but its different 
manifestations reveal (or conceal) different aspects of social life. Look-
ing at efforts to define and theorize the notion of “corporate culture” re-
veals a number of assumptions implicit in legal scholarship. 
                                                                                                             
way the polity accepts or does not accept antitakeover mechanisms, and the political muscle of man-
agers. Id. at 1258. These are all aspects an anthropologist might study as cultural. 
 23. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Corporate Culture and the Nature of the Firm, in 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND 249–69 (John Groenewegen ed., 1996); David M. 
Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 90, 109–110 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); George A. Akerlof & 
Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2005); Max 
H. Boisot, Markets and Hierarchies in a Cultural Perspective, 7 ORG. STUD. 135 (1986); Jacques 
Crémer, Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 351 (1993); Dennis 
A. Gioia, Majken Schultz & Kevin G. Corley, Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Insta-
bility, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 63 (2000); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Economics & Corporate Culture 
(Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ 
hermalin/cultchds.pdf. 
 24. E.g., Yochanan Altman & Yehuda Baruch, Cultural Theory and Organizations: Analytical 
Method and Cases, 19 ORG. STUD. 769 (1998); Andrew D. Brown, A Narrative Approach to Collec-
tive Identities, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 731 (2006); Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity, and Legiti-
macy, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 643 (1997); Lynn V. Meek, Organizational Culture: Origins and 
Weaknesses, 9 ORG. STUD. 453 (1988); John Weeks & Charles Galunic, A Theory of the Cultural 
Evolution of the Firm: The Intra-Organizational Ecology of Memes, 24 ORG. STUD. 1309 (2003). 
 25. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, When Ethics Travel: The Promise and 
Peril of Global Business Ethics, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 45, 45 (1999); Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas 
Donaldson, Contractarian Business Ethics: Current Status and Next Steps, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 173 
(1995); Brian W. Kulik, Agency Theory, Reasoning and Culture at Enron: In Search of a Solution, 
59 J. BUS. ETHICS 347 (2005); Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture 
Matters More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003); Andrew Spicer, Thomas W. Dunfee & 
Wendy J. Bailey, Does National Context Matter in Ethical Decision Making? An Empirical Test of 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 610 (2004). 
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The genealogy of the concept of corporate culture within legal dis-
course has had real-world consequences. That genealogy was, for exam-
ple, one lever for the legitimization of the very ideas of corporate politi-
cal speech and corporate religion—of the notion that a culture, a reli-
gion, or a political stance might be a solid, homogeneous thing held by 
these particulate, heterogeneous organizations. 
The celebrated corporate takeover case of Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time Inc. illustrates the enduring prominence of outmoded, 
static concepts of culture in the law.26 Consider “Time Culture,” a con-
cept portrayed by the defendants to be something very like the timeless 
totalities imagined by anthropologies of old. While the court engaged 
with this terminology in only the most reluctant terms—laden with scare-
quotes (“preservation of Time’s ‘culture’”) or with oblique and carefully 
nondeterministic language—the concept of a unitary corporate culture 
nonetheless retained a sort of strategic legitimacy.27 
This way of thinking about corporate culture is out of step, howev-
er, with modern conceptions of culture generally recognized in social 
scientific circles. Anthropologists—and social scientists more general-
ly—nowadays do not tend to speak in terms of “a culture” or “the cul-
ture” of a group. Of particular interest here is an anthropological view of 
culture that takes the concept as an analytical device highlighting pro-
cesses, tensions, and relations, rather than thing-like entities or identities. 
This view is best understood through contrast with its predecessor.28 
Classically, an anthropological study might have considered culture to be 
manifested through a society’s ceremonial clothing, its “timeless” tradi-
tions and practices, and/or its seemingly homogenous traditions of 
                                                 
 26. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 27. See id. at 1145, 1148 (“Time culture” references). Based on its liberal use of scare-quotes, 
the court appears to be gently skeptical of the concept; however, it does not reject it. The court 
makes no pronouncement as to the ultimate merit of the concept itself, but its finding in favor of 
Time may be seen as an imprimatur upon the company’s use of the concept to advance its claims. 
 28. In the early 1900s, culture tended to be viewed as something “superorganic”—as shared 
beliefs and practices effervescing up from groups of people to form something quite distinct from 
the individuals from which it arose—and thus able to order action in patterned ways over time. Re-
searchers like Margaret Mead and Franz Boas popularized the superorganic conceptions of culture 
associated with their work in a way unmatched in anthropology since. Thus, Conley and O’Barr 
noted that the superorganic is the view of culture popularly associated with anthropology to this day: 
as concerned chiefly with “tribal” societies ruled by seemingly homogenous and unquestioned val-
ues and usually located elsewhere than the researcher’s home society. John M. Conley & William M. 
O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1997). The superorganic theory contrasts with a slightly later view 
taking culture to be merely a description of statistically-likely tendencies forming patterns for an 
aggregation of individuals. Id. at 9. 
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thought.29 If we were to imagine culture in the form of a tent, we might 
say that these classic studies would focus upon the rods and pieces of 
fabric as constituting the essence of “the tent.” Applying this lens to to-
day’s “corporate culture,” these rods and pieces of fabric might be mis-
sion statements, historical brochures, and comportment guidelines. 
More recent rethinking of culture, however, suggests a different 
perspective.30 Instead, the central concern is with the tensions and fric-
tions between the rods and the stretches of polyester; the relationships 
between them; the forces that stick them together in the form we see as 
our tent. Concretely, we might look at the impact of legal rules and his-
torical trends, various articulations of group boundaries and their effect 
on group identity, or power struggles as they shift over time. In short, 
this newer anthropological approach focuses not upon the pieces of the 
tent but upon the relationships between the pieces. 
A reexamination of culture is crucially important for corporate law, 
where discursive deployments of the concept have had particularly dra-
matic effect; how we conceptualize culture has “worldly consequences 
that threaten to effect significant shifts in power and resources.”31 Citi-
zens United, Carnell, and Hobby Lobby are important not only directly 
but also in terms of the cultural narratives to which they contribute, 
which have real-world effects as well. Anthropological takes on law il-
                                                 
 29. For some background regarding these older images of anthropology, and critiques thereof, 
see generally ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (Talal Asad ed., 1973); WRITING 
CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & George F. Marcus eds., 
1986); 1 JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION (1991); 
CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (Nicholas Dirks, Geoff 
Eley & Sherry Ortner eds., 1994); CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997). 
 30. The first of these is the recent reinterpretation of classic anthropological concepts of culture 
propagated by Franz Boas and his students, who “developed empathetic models of and methods for 
cross-cultural understanding; a historicist orientation to culture change; a sense of tradition as per-
petually reconstructed in the present, engaging emotional attachments, and motivating secondary 
rationalizations; and a healthy suspicion of social science itself as always potentially just such a 
secondary ideological reflex of our own culture.” Ira Bashkow, Matti Bunzl, Richard Handler, An-
drew Orta & Daniel Rosenblatt, A New Boasian Anthropology: Theory for the 21st Century, 106 
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 433, 433–34 (2004). The second is the particular variant of Actor–Network 
Theory, espoused by the anthropologist Bruno Latour, which shows how disparate parts come to be 
perceived as concrete, whole, and self-sustaining actors—“black boxes.” This concreteness is not 
stable but processual; it is continuously enacted. See John Law, Notes on the Theory of the Actor-
Network: Ordering, Strategy and Heterogeneity, 5 SYS. PRAC. 379, 381 (1992); see also Michel 
Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fish-
ermen of St Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196 
(John Law ed. 1986); Jim Johnson, Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a 
Door-Closer, 35 SOC. PROBS. 298 (1988). 
 31. Coombe, supra note 13, at 262. 
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lustrate and foreground both these narratives and their effects on human 
lives.32 A number of corporate law scholars have persuasively argued the 
importance of judicial narratives in the development of the doctrine of 
corporate personhood and in corporate law theory more generally.33 As 
Teemu Ruskola has argued, decentering commonly held perspectives on 
these organizations is key in theorizing them.34 Given perspectives such 
as these, I anticipate an important role for anthropological takes on cor-
porations in corporate law scholarship. 
One of anthropology’s main contributions in this respect may well 
be to change the kinds of questions we ask and the kind of “work” we 
expect the concept of culture to “do.” Attention to the concept of culture 
in existing corporate legal scholarship recognizes that culture is im-
                                                 
 32. Regarding the value of anthropological theory in legal scholarship, Conley and O’Barr take 
from Stanislaw Malinowski’s classic Crime and Custom in Savage Society the point that: “The an-
thropological perspective reminds us that we can benefit from putting law back into its cultural con-
text, emphasizing the very connection between law and society that formal legal proceedings often 
seek to suppress” and that “human beings always practice in cultural ways.” Conley & O’Barr, supra 
note 18, at 6. Yet, anthropological scholarship and legal scholarship on corporations are seldom in 
conversation with one another; this despite a long history of anthropological scholarly engagement 
with corporations. See, e.g., KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, 
DISASTER, NEW ORDERS (2001); STUART KIRSCH, REVERSE ANTHROPOLOGY (2006); SUZANA 
SAWYER, CRUDE CHRONICLES: INDIGENOUS POLITICS, MULTINATIONAL OIL, AND NEOLIBERALISM 
IN ECUADOR (2004); June Nash, Anthropology of the Multinational Corporation, in THE POLITICS 
OF ANTHROPOLOGY: FROM COLONIALISM AND SEXISM TOWARD A VIEW FROM BELOW 421 (Gerrit 
Huizer & Bruce Mannheim eds., 1979). A newer body of scholarship works to theorize the corpora-
tion in anthropological terms, albeit not necessarily cultural ones. See, e.g., Leslie C. Aiello & James 
F. Brooks, Corporate Lives: New Perspectives on the Social Life of the Corporate Form, 52 
SUPPLEMENT 3 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S1–S2 (2011); Robert J. Foster, Corporate Oxymorons 
and the Anthropology of Corporations, 34 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 95 (2010); Stuart Kirsch, 
Imagining Corporate Personhood, 37 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 207 (2014); Dinah 
Rajak, Theatres of Virtue: Collaboration, Consensus and the Social Life of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 60 FOCAAL: J. GLOBAL & HIST. ANTHROPOLOGY 9 (2011); see also Greg Urban & 
Kyung-Nan Koh, Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations, 42 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 139 (2013). My own work is concerned with putting legal and anthropological 
theory in conversation; thus, it is the first work transporting insights from a modern anthropological 
view of culture into corporate law scholarship. 
 33. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP (2000); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1149 (1997); Joel Edan Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal 
Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31 (1996); David Graver, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Cor-
porate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235 (1999); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Corporate Theo-
ry and the Role of Narrative, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933 (2009); Warren J. Samuels, The Idea of 
the Corporation as a Person: On the Normative Significance of Judicial Language, in 
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 113 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. 
Miller eds., Greenwood Press 1987); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial 
Policy and the “Essence” of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988). 
 34. Teemu Ruskola, What Is a Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of 
Enterprise Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood), 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 639 (2014). 
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portant insofar as it helps us to understand the behavior of corporations. 
Deserving of more attention, however, is the notion that culture might 
also be central to the question of what the corporation is.35 Cultural con-
siderations suffuse not only the dynamics of the behavior of the corpora-
tion but also its legal theorizations—a point similar to that made regard-
ing the link between scholars’ political stances and their takes upon the 
value of different styles of corporate regulation.36 What we imagine the 
corporation to be (the ontological question absolutely foundational to any 
discussion of corporate law) and how we imagine the corporation should 
behave (our normative stance, inextricable from our view of the world) 
may both be analyzed as cultural questions. They might arise from ethi-
cal and political leanings. More fundamentally, they can come from our 
own theories as to how groups are formed and cohere, how preferences 
are prioritized within heterogeneous groups, and how we imagine the 
agentive status of the group and of individuals involved in those groups. 
That is, they come from our theories of culture, acknowledged or 
unacknowledged. Culture has everything to do with the conclusions we 
come to regarding the nature of corporations and their role in society. 
In Citizens United, Carnell, and Hobby Lobby, cultural issues were 
implicated not only directly—via, for instance, the seemingly obvious 
cultural questions of the possibility of assigning racial or religious identi-
ty to a corporation—but also in the way the courts, the parties, and the 
public approached and came to conclusions regarding those questions. 
The result in each of these cases was controlled less by evident commit-
ments to particular theories of the corporation than by particular, if 
unacknowledged, theories of the nature and dynamics of social groups—
assumptions in regard to the importance of the individual within them,37 
how they come to be,38 and who speaks on behalf of the group.39 In short, 
the Justices, and all of us, are closet cultural theorists. The task of un-
packing what this means only benefits from a more anthropological per-
spective. 
                                                 
 35. Cf. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Corporate Culture and the Nature of the Firm, in TRANSACTION 
COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND (John Groenewegen ed., 1996). 
 36. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984) 
(demonstrating a link between typical political stances and the types of corporate law reform schol-
ars suggest); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Crite-
ria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77 (2005). 
 37. Cf. Romano, supra note 36, at 926–34. 
 38. Cf. ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013); Katsuhito 
Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (1999). 
 39. For instance, questions of whether a “group belief” can exist in the context of heterogene-
ous belief, as opposed to something like a decision to take or not take an action. 
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II. THE CONTINGENT CORPORATION 
Conceptions of the behavior of the corporation have long evinced 
an individualistic and atomistic stance. Hence, for example, the version 
of group theorizing on view in Time—the idea evinced, even if not clear-
ly articulated, that in looking at an aspect of the corporation that is based 
in some personal characteristic, you are looking at some discrete and 
bounded thing to which such a characteristic might be attributed—as we 
might think of a human individual. We might thus speak in terms of the 
(singular, unitary) corporation’s (singular, unitary) identity or belief. In-
deed, a group can speak with one voice, according both to common un-
derstandings and to legal ones.40 
But whether thought of in terms of entity status or in terms of ag-
gregate status, the corporation is better analogized to a community than 
to an individual. Instead of something that might be understood as simply 
evincing a certain personal characteristic (and here an analogue might be 
to personality characteristics amenable to psychological study), the cor-
poration is an unbounded object which we must think of in terms of the 
interaction of multiple, diffuse tensions and forces—its various parts 
marked by and allotted with powers of agentive action and the disavowal 
of agentive action; with responsibility and lack of responsibility.41 Cor-
porate personal attributes (e.g., the belief underpinning a free exercise 
claim; the “intellect and conscience” underpinning an act of political 
speech) and the nature of the rights arising out of them can only be un-
derstood in relational terms.42 To understand the corporation in terms of 
personal characteristics, we must, then, understand culture. 
This modern anthropological view of culture allows us to more eas-
ily see the ways in which recent court decisions have begun to instantiate 
                                                 
 40. We might consider newspapers, “official statements” of sports teams, or the political pref-
erences of the Boy Scouts of America as an organization. 
 41. See Lawrence Rosen, Introduction: The Cultural Analysis of Others’ Inner States, in 
OTHER INTENTIONS: CULTURAL CONTEXTS AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF INNER STATES 3 (Lawrence 
Rosen ed., 1995). 
 42. And not merely relationships involving shareholders and management. Here I reference, 
but resist, Stephen Bainbridge’s conception of corporations as able to hold communities within 
them, but unable to become communities. On this point, Bainbridge has argued that while “the cor-
poration may harbor within it sub-groups that amount to communities of shared values,” nonetheless 
“a corporation’s shareholders, creditors, and customers almost by definition cannot form communi-
ties. The host of familiar collective action problems that prevent shareholders from participating in 
corporate decisionmaking, for example, preclude them from developing any sense of community. 
Instead, true communities are most likely to arise among those who work for the corporation.” Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 896 (1997). While it is beyond the scope of 
this article to engage fully with the vast legal and social scientific literatures on community, I refer to 
Bainbridge’s critique to underscore the complexity of the issue. 
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a unique theory of the corporation. Citizens United initiated, and Hobby 
Lobby extended, a new (or, more accurately, recovered) vision of the 
corporation—what I call the “Contingent Corporation.” The term, with 
its reference to the classical anthropological concept of magical conta-
gion,43 highlights the process by which distinctions between corporations 
and the people involved with them have been blurred and rendered more 
legitimate and intuitive, such that rights traditionally considered exclu-
sive to human beings have been assigned to corporations.44 In Hobby 
Lobby, for example, the Supreme Court conflated the religious beliefs of 
the corporations’ controlling shareholders with those of the firm itself.45 
This understanding of the corporation assigns to the corporate person the 
cultural characteristics, social ties, civic commitments, and internal lives 
of the humans involved with it—not unproblematically. 
The nature of corporations—and the nature of the rights and re-
sponsibilities these persons might therefore be properly accorded—is 
endlessly debatable.46 John Dewey’s comments from early in the last 
century have, ever since, flavored the way that scholars have imagined 
the nature of the corporation (and the nature of debates over the nature of 
the corporation). Dewey argued that contemporary debates regarding the 
nature of corporate personhood were pointless without some acknowl-
edgement of both the normative commitments of the arguers—where 
was our starting point, and toward what ideal did we aim?—and the em-
pirical reality, the lived lives these ideals purported to describe. Whatev-
er the state of debate, “person,” Dewey wearily specified, “signifies what 
law makes it signify.”47 This debate has taken place on many fields.48 
                                                 
43. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 44. The usage here is a distinct one and should be distinguished from, for example, Elizabeth 
Sheyn’s “humanized” corporation. Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: 
Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
 45. See ORTS, supra note 38. 
 46. Consider the 1932 date of Max Radin’s The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 
COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932). 
 47. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
655 (1926) (internal quotation marks omitted). While it is easy to read Dewey to conclude that the 
debate is thus pointless, see id. at 669, some have cautioned against this reading, calling it hasty. 
Orts cautions, “A close reading of Dewey . . . suggests that he did not take the extreme position that 
the idea of legal personality should be abandoned. Dewey argued only that the idea itself should not 
drive legal and policy-related conclusions about the rights and obligations of legal persons.” ORTS, 
supra note 38, at 17 n.37. 
 48. For instance, classic scholarly debates on the corporation have mulled the status of the 
corporate person as real or imaginary, as the natural result of economic activity or as artificial crea-
tion of the state; the need for and the optimal extent to which corporations ought to be regulated in 
the interests of the public; what “ownership” of a corporation can or should mean; and the uses to 
which the corporate personhood idea may be put. See, e.g., Iwai, supra note 38; David Millon, Theo-
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Most at issue in regard to the Contingent Corporation is the ques-
tion of whether the corporation is best theorized as an entity in itself or as 
a mere aggregation of individuals. Entity theories of the nature of the 
corporation take the “personhood” bit of corporate personhood to indi-
cate that the firm is an actual, separate entity from its shareholders.49 Ag-
gregate theories posit that the corporation is only and entirely the pile of 
human people, connected through actual or implied contractual relation-
ships, that actually make up the firm.50 Aggregate theories have long 
dominated corporate law scholarship and tend to be associated with law 
and economics methodologies.51 
Citizens United, however, troubled these theoretical distinctions. 
Rather than being explicable by reference either to an aggregate or an 
entity theory of the corporation, Citizens United appeared to be charac-
terized by a combination of these two theoretical positions—or perhaps 
by one entirely different from either. The corporation was, the Court not-
ed, a speaker, an entity. At the same time, its rights rose in reference to 
“people” who might be imagined as the constituents of the corporation or 
the audience—the American people. 
To be sure, courts’ treatments of the nature of the corporation have 
long exhibited inconsistencies. Throughout the last century, courts have 
switched cheerfully back and forth, sometimes mid-opinion, in the idea 
of the corporation on which their analysis rests.52 The current inconsist-
encies are different. They are characterized neither by blending views—
the court does not merely take some hypothetical middle ground—nor by 
alternating between them. The current cases depend instead upon a dia-
lectical view of the nature of corporations that holds aloft both theories at 
once. 
These are old debates, but there are reasons that they continue. For 
example, while the question of the corporation’s ability to hold constitu-
tional rights has long been settled, the nature, extent, and context of any 
particular right so extended were questions quite unsettled prior to Citi-
                                                                                                             
ries of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Concep-
tion of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 96 (1995). 
 49. See generally Millon, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Reuven Avi-Yonah cites one instance of a vigorous use of such switchery in the case Hale 
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). There, he relates, the Court managed to use by turns each of three 
different theoretical stances. “[H]aving clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the 
constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverted back to the aggregate view when faced with the 
question of whether corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all . . . .” Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1016 (2010). 
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zens United.53 Although Citizens United did not speak in terms of per-
sons, the opinion expanded the conceptual space for corporations as 
something we could call “human-like” and for the idea that corporations’ 
rights should be indistinguishable from the rights of individuals.54 It is 
this space for imagining corporations as human-like and thus naturally 
due rights once thought of as “personal” that gives rise to the Contingent 
Corporation. 
This Part of the Article will work to unpack the implicit theoriza-
tions of the nature of groups and the nature of personhood that underlies 
these new changes. Subpart A will sketch the course of recent corporate 
law jurisprudence as it marks the Contingent Corporation. Subpart B will 
examine corporatism, one historical analogue of the present moment in 
corporate law and theory. Tracing two influential, ideal-typical views of 
the nature and the purpose of the corporation, subpart B will also consid-
er what may be gleaned from a previous, similar (but not identical) mo-
ment of corporate entwinement with the personal characteristics of affili-
ated natural persons. 
A. Conceptions of the Corporation 
The Contingent Corporation blooms from Citizens United. First, the 
case normalized a mode of analysis that does not overly concern itself 
with the characteristics of different versions of the corporate form, in-
stead erring on the side of characterizing rights based in personal attrib-
utes—traditionally considered applicable only to natural persons—as 
extendable to corporations and as indistinguishable in any relevant sense 
from the way the right is protected for human persons.55 This move, in 
turn, begat the simplified analysis of corporations’ claims to rights based 
in personal attributes that is visible in Hobby Lobby. Of course, some of 
the gifts granted by Citizens United are at first difficult to discern; for 
instance, I contend that the notion of the nature of the corporation sanc-
tioned in Citizens United led directly to the somewhat different-looking 
notion in Hobby Lobby. Yet even though Hobby Lobby departs slightly 
from the notion of the nature of the corporation championed in Citizens 
                                                 
 53. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 54. For works exploring the establishment and earlier expansions of this conceptual space, see 
John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in 
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. 
Miller eds., Greenwood Press 1987); Samuels, supra note 33; James Boyd White, How Should We 
Talk About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 
(1985). 
 55. Ellen D. Katz, Hobby Lobby and the Pathology of Citizens United, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 23 (2014). 
370 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:353 
United, articulation of that stance in the earlier case dramatically shaped 
the conceptual spaces that the corporation might properly be seen to oc-
cupy. The resulting image of the corporation in Hobby Lobby is, in fact, 
an attempt to hold entity and aggregate views of the corporation in gen-
erative tension. 
An early corporate political speech precedent, First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, indicated that the questions regarding the protec-
tions of a “personal” right extended to corporations were necessarily con-
textual and openly “depend[ed] on the nature, history, and purpose of the 
particular constitutional provision.”56 But Citizens United, disclaiming 
the relevance of Bellotti’s indications to the contrary, read the opinion to 
unambiguously indicate that corporations simply were speakers, indistin-
guishable from any other speakers, for the purposes of First Amendment 
speech rights.57 Thomas Rutledge’s recent analysis of the appropriateness 
of a personal right for corporations affirms the Bellotti notion that “those 
protections are afforded on a case-by-case basis.”58 Rutledge further em-
phasizes the limited and specific nature of corporate rights and the abid-
ing importance of context.59 Rutledge’s reading echoes that of Elizabeth 
Pollman, who outlined the previously nonbinary nature of the rights at-
taching to corporate persons.60 The bright-line approach favored by the 
current Court is a new development. 
                                                 
 56. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (stating a “personal 
right” refers to a right based not in “personhood” but in some personal attribute). 
 57. Id. at nn.14, 26; see also Katz, supra note 55, at 34 (“Citizens United notwithstanding, 
Bellotti itself never questioned that the political activities of corporations could be regulated more 
extensively than the political activities of individuals. Instead, Bellotti crafted what it described as a 
limited exception to that principle, making clear along the way that it was not ruling that corpora-
tions themselves possessed a First Amendment right to engage in political speech.”). 
 58. Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Law Response to 
Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2014). 
 59. Rutledge notes: 
For example, a corporation may be a ‘person’ with a defined citizenship who may access 
the federal courts by means of diversity jurisdiction. It benefits from due process and 
equal protection of the law, may exercise the rights of a free press, and enjoys protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure of its property. Conversely, a corporation has no 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and its due process rights are restricted 
as compared to those of natural persons. A First Amendment right to petition the gov-
ernment exists and a corporate expenditure with respect to an election may not be re-
stricted on the basis of its corporate form, but political contributions by that same corpo-
ration may be restricted. A corporation has no right to vote, hold elected office, or sit on a 
jury. A corporation is not a person for determining the allocation of seats among the 
states in the House of Representatives. An indigent corporation is not entitled to state-
appointed legal counsel.  
Id. at 24–25 (citations omitted). 
 60. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1630–
31 (2011). 
2016] Culture in Corporate Law 371 
But the Court’s reading opened the door for new arguments and 
analyses regarding the extension of rights to corporations based in per-
sonal attributes. Contrary to the multifaceted analysis exercised in earlier 
cases, Citizens United appeared to indicate that a more simplified analy-
sis might be appropriate. The former mode of inquiry asked whether, 
given particular circumstances and societal concerns, it made sense to 
extend a personal right to corporations—and if so, what ought to be the 
character and limits of those rights?61 In Citizens United, and later in 
Hobby Lobby, the inquiry is much less nebulous. Essentially, it focuses 
on one question only and reframes it in a somewhat reductive way: Does 
anything about the right at issue indicate that its protections ought not 
include corporations? 
Corporate political speech limitations were, therefore, presumptive-
ly unconstitutional. Because nothing could be shown to indicate that 
speakers protected by the First Amendment did not include corporations, 
the government lost any ground to bar the corporation from enjoying the 
related personal right or to allow the state’s discriminatory behavior.62 
Regarding the development of the Contingent Corporation, the revolu-
tionary effect of Citizens United is not a declaration that corporations 
have constitutional rights to political speech practically coterminous with 
those of natural persons, but that corporations have constitutional rights 
to political speech because they are, as speakers, practically indistin-
guishable from individuals. 
This narrowing of the distance between the varied nature and rights 
of natural persons and those of corporations is the founding move in es-
tablishing the Contingent Corporation. The ultimate effect of Citizens 
United was to enable the curious linkage of entity and constituent rights 
on display in Hobby Lobby. 
Citizens United’s swift, matter-of-fact manner of dealing with the 
question of the nature of the rights that may validly belong to the corpo-
ration was one step toward granting legitimacy to the idea that personal 
rights might naturally belong to them. Not surprisingly, the case gave 
rise to a flurry of speculation as to what other “personal” rights might 
become available to corporations.63 As critiques and celebrations of the 
various possibilities emerged, so too did the political will to test the lim-
                                                 
 61. See generally id. 
62. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–41 (2010). 
 63. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Do Corporations Have First Amendment Rights to Free Exercise 
of Religion?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 28, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/28/ 
do-corporations-have-first-amendment-rights-to-free-exercise-of-religion/; Ed Whelan, Wobbly 
Hobby Lobby Ruling in Favor of HHS Mandate, NAT. REV. (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.national 
review.com/bench-memos/333808/wobbly-hobby-lobby-ruling-favor-hhs-mandate-ed-whelan. 
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its. Opportunity arose in the form of the Affordable Care Act’s birth con-
trol mandate. 
The effect of Citizens United was thus not merely to reinforce polit-
ical speech rights for corporations. More importantly, it fundamentally 
reframed the very debate regarding the rights imagined to naturally apply 
to human individuals versus those properly recognized as belonging to 
corporations. It empowered later courts to reconceptualize corporations 
in such a way as to essentially conflate and equate them with human per-
sons. The implications of this convergence of categories are acutely im-
portant when it comes to the ability of corporations to have personal 
rights traditionally seen as applying only to “people” with some variety 
of internal mental, religious, or ethnic life. And crucially, this naturaliza-
tion of the corporation will be key in legitimating further extensions of 
the personal rights that a corporation can be argued to have. 
Given the “personal” nature of these rights, the Contingent Corpo-
ration’s ability to “have” some particular cultural, racial, or political 
characteristic depends, to a not-insignificant extent, upon perceptions of 
the nature of ownership. Whose beliefs does the corporation hold? 
Whose opinions and preferences count when the corporation speaks? 
Dominant conceptions of ownership in the corporate context tend to take 
shareholding as only superficially different from the usual sense of do-
minion. While shareholders might relinquish control to management, this 
is generally assumed to be in the nature of an agency relationship: man-
agers manage the owned property interest on behalf of the shareholders. 
Some have argued, however, that this is a fundamental misappre-
hension of the nature of shareholding, the nature of management, and, 
indeed, the nature of the corporation. Instead of a relationship of man-
agement agency on behalf of shareholders, recent scholarship—and re-
cent rereadings of classic understandings—cast shareholder ownership 
quite differently.64 Even were the character of corporate shareholding 
coterminous with other notions of property ownership, property is always 
a relationship; ownership always carries with it wider societal obliga-
tions.65 And just as notions of shareholding are being rethought, so too 
                                                 
 64. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
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has it become increasingly clear that arguments for shareholder primacy 
are not necessarily bound to arguments for share value maximization. In 
Hobby Lobby, for example, the Court dismissed the government’s asser-
tion that share value maximization was necessarily an overriding re-
quirement in corporate management—but it did not dismiss the notion of 
shareholder primacy. Justice Alito’s initial framing of those who matter 
in determining the corporation’s views included shareholders, officers, 
and employees.66   
Ultimately, however, the religious beliefs that ought, in the Court’s 
estimation, to rule the corporation’s “beliefs” were those of the control-
ling shareholders.67 In considering a corporation’s personal attributes, we 
have to know which constituencies we ought to look at to find them. 
When the government posed this question at oral argument in Hobby 
Lobby, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia answered quite elegantly: 
[Solicitor] General Verrilli: . . . Your Honor, what are you going to 
do if there’s a dispute between—let’s say there are three sharehold-
ers—a dispute between two in the majority and one in the minority? 
You’re going to have to get yourself involved—the courts will have 
to get themselves involved in all kinds of— 
Justice Scalia: Whoever controls the corporation. Whoever controls 
the corporation determines what the party— 
                                                                                                             
The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Jedediah 
Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). 
 66. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“An established body 
of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and em-
ployees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another.”). 
 67. And controlling officers only because these were, within both companies, the same people. 
That belief matters is, uncontroversially, an essential part of a free exercise claim; RFRA’s definition 
of the free exercise of religion, while discrete and distinct from that within the First Amendment, 
does not excise this requirement. Although RFRA analysis does not demand evidence that an exer-
cise be “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” the requirement of the presence of 
the assertion of belief in some such system is quite clear. Regarding the ability of the corporate 
entity to have beliefs, the Court cited as “true—but quite beside the point.” Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 
2768. The Third Circuit’s opinion also stated that “[g]eneral business corporations do not, separate 
and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise reli-
gion.” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). But the Court does not read the beliefs of the corpo-
ration to be “separate and apart from” those of the corporate entity: “Corporations, ‘separate and 
apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. The Court is able to minimize discussion of the beliefs of the corpora-
tion “on its own terms”—the beliefs of the corporation “itself”—precisely because with this com-
ment it made coterminous the beliefs of the corporation and the beliefs of the human beings (specifi-
cally the controlling human beings) associated with it. 
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[Solicitor] General Verrilli: And then—and the minority sharehold-
er will say, well, this is—under state law, this is an act of oppres-
sion and this is— 
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, that’s a question of State corporate 
law.68 
Leave it, that is, to shareholder democracy. The answer belies a number 
of critical assumptions about ownership and about the nature of personal 
attributes for corporations. That is to say, for Scalia, and for the Court, 
we may read personal attributes into corporations because: 
1) Shareholders have personal attributes; 
2) Shareholders own the corporation; and 
3) As owners, they may use the expedient of shareholder democ-
racy to decide that the corporation simply has the attribute at is-
sue: it is a Muslim corporation, a Native American corporation, 
or what-have-you. 
An interesting conception of property rights must necessarily un-
derlie this viewpoint, one that appears oddly bound up in what might 
usually be considered a conventional aggregate view of the firm. If the 
corporation is an aggregate of individual shareholders-owners, it makes 
sense in this view that shareholders will have originary say over what the 
corporation does (by way of their chosen managers). But there is, in an 
aggregate theory of the firm, no necessary linkage between the share-
holders’ personal attributes and those of the corporation. 
Yet when it came to imagining whose preferences, priorities, and 
personalities ought to bestow upon the corporation its “personality,” it 
was the perception of corporate ownership as simultaneously character-
ized by and necessitating shareholder primacy that emerged as dominant. 
It is unsurprising, then, that scholars and laypersons alike seem to more 
easily attribute ethnicity, race, or religion to closely held corporations, 
and this appears to become more pronounced the more closely held the 
corporation is perceived to be.69 The closer the imagined link between 
shareholders and the corporation, the easier the conceptual transfer of the 
former’s identities, rights, and preferences to the latter. 
However, the Court’s failure to clearly articulate this transfer’s le-
gitimating characteristics, as well as its practical limits, is highly prob-
lematic. In fact, the Hobby Lobby Court’s loose, commonsense deploy-
                                                 
 68. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52–53, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (transcript refers to former-Secretary Kathleen Sebelius), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354_3ebh.pdf. 
 69. See ORTS, supra note 38, at 157–58. 
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ment of the term “closely held” renders the term’s referential status prob-
lematic as a matter of doctrine. As the Court does not distinguish be-
tween the many ways in which a corporation might be defined as closely 
held, the term acts as a failed limit. Yet, the pertinent question is not 
whether a claimant corporation is or is not closely held. The Court fo-
cused much of its analysis upon the closely held nature of Hobby Lobby 
and Conestoga Wood as a limit to its opinion’s broad application.70 
However, the Court only narrowly discussed the characteristics that 
make a corporation “closely held”; this narrow discussion enabled the 
Court to assert that it seemed “unlikely that the sort of [large, publicly 
traded] corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA 
claims.”71 
As “corporate giant” and “closely held” are not mutually exclusive 
terms, this statement is only accurate if the Justices imagine that some 
salient difference exists that might distinguish a corporation as “Hobby 
Lobby close” from close in a way that would cause an inappropriate re-
sult. Thus, something must motivate the assumption that the rule articu-
lated in Hobby Lobby will transform when extended to the depersonal-
ized behemoths (S.C. Johnson, for example) that are closely held in ways 
that may be legally indistinguishable from Hobby Lobby Stores and 
Conestoga Wood. This must be so, even though the giant corporations 
bear no trace of the characteristics motivating the Court’s sympathy in 
the initial case. The implication is that the Justices, while not articulating 
such a belief, must assume some sort of dividing line between these dif-
ferent iterations of what are, definitionally, “close companies.” What is 
the nature of that line? 
The corporation more amenable to Hobby Lobby closeness would 
seem to be more a product of human social norms. This type of corpora-
tion is, to the Court, more legitimately treated as human, blurring the rel-
evance of any distinction between various types of person. The corpora-
tion is thus quite summarily treated much as a human individual might. 
For good or ill, rhetorical imprecision is the device by which the 
law is changed even while judges gesture to the confines of stare 
decisis.72 It is a mechanism that appears to be operant in the development 
                                                 
70. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.  
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of both the campaign finance jurisprudence embodied in Citizens United 
and the RFRA jurisprudence of Hobby Lobby. 
In both Carnell and Hobby Lobby, we see the development of an 
image of the corporation as made up somehow of the people underlying 
it and simultaneously taking on some kind of status from the corporation 
as entity. Neither case makes sense under only one or the other of these 
theories; instead, the arguments depend on the ability to hold entity and 
aggregate stances simultaneously. The people underlying the corporation 
are what the rights of the corporation arise from; yet, they cannot claim 
this right except in reference to the corporation as entity. The corporate 
entity cannot be said to hold the human-ish characteristic claimed by the 
underlying people to need protection—the right can, however, be read in 
if one can imagine the corporation as aggregate. Entity status affords the 
corporation the tenor of individual personhood, and aggregate status im-
parts personal attributes, distinctions between human and corporate per-
sonal rights become more difficult to maintain. 
An example may help illustrate this situation. A crucial point for 
the analysis of a free-exercise claim is “belief”: “[A]bsent religious belief 
the Free Exercise Clause is without application.”73 This means that, in 
order for such a claim to prevail as asserted by the corporation, either 
the corporation must “believe” (under an entity theory) or what are con-
sidered the corporation’s “beliefs” must be the beliefs of some individual 
or individuals associated with it (under a very loose aggregate theory). 
However, as the mandate cases made their way through the courts, nei-
ther of these two views appeared especially promising. On the other 
hand, we might reject wholesale the ability of corporations to raise any 
such claim, asserting that corporations, “[b]eing only creatures of posi-
tive law with defined and limited powers,” must necessarily “lack a spir-
itual element.”74 
The horns of this dilemma are hardly new, nor are attempts to rec-
oncile them.75 Indeed, such efforts once dominated American debates on 
the nature and responsibilities of the corporation—especially in response 
                                                                                                             
Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE 
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to the Great Depression. The next subpart reviews this discussion and 
considers the implications of its correspondence to contemporary de-
bates. 
B. Solidarity and Disintegration in the Nature of the Corporation 
As the Great Depression raged in the 1930s, and in its wake, as 
people tried to figure out what had gone wrong and how to fix it, Ameri-
can thinkers began to take up the insights from the corporatist ideas cur-
rent in Europe.76 Corporatism describes a strand of social theory that im-
agined as ideal a system of centrally-planned, overlapping, hierarchical 
corporations—social organizations whose raison d’etre was the ordering 
of society, not the market.77 
The Contingent Corporation is strikingly consistent with these cor-
poratist conceptions. What is most salient for the Contingent Corporation 
is, in fact, its emergent group properties—whether we characterize these 
as moral, spiritual, cultural, or something else in nature. The key is the 
conception of the corporation as effervescing from and feeding the pref-
erences of the people underlying—not just making up—the group. This 
compatibility of the Contingent Corporation with a corporatist perspec-
tive is significant because it suggests a capacity for the corporation as 
necessarily implicated in societal expectations and outcomes. 
Indeed, writing just before the recent financial crisis, William Brat-
ton and Michael Wachter predicted the impending arrival of a new era 
for corporatism.78 Bratton and Wachter’s position makes sense on a 
number of levels. For example, great similarity exists as to the proximity 
to crisis between today and the years following the Great Depression. 
Today’s popular political desire for change in the business corporation’s 
legal and social status also appears to be similar to that experienced after 
the Great Depression. Regardless of the distribution of discomfiture with 
the corporation’s privileges, the corporation’s proper place in society is 
currently, as then, a conspicuously open question. This comparison is not 
to say that the current moment signals some full-throated return of the 
popularity of corporatism. It is not much of a stretch, however, to suggest 
that the central questions and concerns undergirding both the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in the Contingent Corporation cases and my own anal-
                                                 
 76. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corpo-
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ysis of the Māori-owned corporation bear some resemblance to those that 
undergirded early twentieth-century corporatist thought. 
Illustrative here is the changing tenor of the work of Adolf Berle in 
regard to these issues. While Berle’s work has long been taken to cham-
pion the idea of shareholder primacy, he spent the middle and later parts 
of his career outlining the ways in which corporations ought to be inter-
twined with community norms.79 Having been made a patron saint of 
shareholder primacy and of law and economics methodologies in the 
theorization of the corporation over the past century, Berle’s work pro-
vides a provocative commentary on the attribution of personal or com-
munal characteristics to corporations in a time with important similarities 
to our own. 
Roberta Romano links Berle’s corporatist ideals directly to his view 
of the role of management as “that of a disinterested public servant, a 
role that could provide the social stability necessary for the attainment of 
the corporatist ideal.”80 Part of the manager’s role was to incorporate the 
diverse views of four distinct constituencies—“suppliers, customers, em-
ployees, and the outside community”—into something stable, even if not 
necessarily harmonic.81 
And yet, a type of spiritualism seen as common to corporatist 
thought is here as well—not in any explicit theory of group cohesion, but 
bound up within the idea of the corporation.82 As with the corporatist 
views that prevailed in Europe, Berle’s vision was suffused with spiritual 
or religious tropes, with the corporation acting as “systemic glue” for its 
constituent parts, as “collective soul” and societal “conscience-carrier.”83 
The end result is that, just as in other visions of corporatism, the deter-
mination of the best path for business—and for society—is left to man-
agers: the manager becomes “the oracle of the public interest.”84 
The corporatist vision generally appears to model the corporation as 
a structure naturally able to carry, or needing to carry, within it some 
kind of conscience.85 It is a vision that also seems naturally aligned with 
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the vision of the corporation expressed by Justice Alito in Hobby Lobby. 
But what is missing in this reading of Berle’s corporatism is attention to 
what might have made this vision of corporate control plausible at the 
time—that is to say, its regulatory and social context.86 With the image 
of corporate law as public law that prevailed at the time, and with it the 
general idea that a main point of corporations was their public benefit, 
Berle’s imagery and his imagining of a constitutionally, socially respon-
sible corporation makes sense—but not without that specific historical 
and regulatory context. 
In Berle’s corporatism, this group-ontology is meant to be embod-
ied in the managers; managers instill in the corporation a group-spirit 
that itself comes from the larger society. Berle does not theorize the for-
mation, the movement, or the terms of this group ontology—what we 
might call “solidarity.” To understand the nature of these processes, we 
look to the classic work of Émile Durkheim, another luminary of the so-
cial theorization of corporate groups. 
Just as corporatist visions of the group raise questions of “con-
science,” so too do they elicit consideration of solidarity. Both internal 
regulation of mores and behavior by the members of the group, and ex-
ternal regulation by the state are necessary to describe the solidarity of 
the group—a necessary alchemy most clearly expressed in Durkheim’s 
work on solidarity and the division of labor.87 In Durkheim’s view, such 
solidarity requires conflict. His focus is upon ways to get at this relation-
ship empirically (what does the group think) and upon describing its re-
cursive nature (how does it come to think). Groups in this conceptualiza-
tion are not so much entities as ongoing processes; their existence arises 
out of, is dependent upon, and may be described by, a state of tension 
between mechanical togetherness and organic entropy. Instead of contra-
dicting or negating each other, each becomes the condition for the other. 
Durkheim’s work is relevant here because it represents a seminal effort 
to describe the genesis and continuation of a group in this processual 
way. 
Durkheim’s first movement in this model is to argue that internal 
moralities better regulate complex groups than do externally imposed 
laws. In this estimation, complex groups must be spontaneously regulat-
ed: regulation from on high will fail to capture the complications and 
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various forms of internal knowledge that are the hallmark of complexity. 
What really and effectively governs the group is solidarity88—
specifically, a form of organic solidarity that emerges spontaneously and 
internally; a form that contains, rather than quashes, the group’s ev-
er-moving equilibrium, containing intact all oppositions inside it. The 
same holds for power inequalities: freedom lies in the expression of 
“precisely natural inequalities.”89 No external modulator should interfere, 
because—so long as there is “absolute equality in the external conditions 
of the struggle”—the powers will push against one another so as to come 
round right.90 This result, predicts Durkheim, will not be anarchy but an 
ordered and naturally regulated expression of “true worth.”91 He thus 
advises against the external imposition of heavy and restrictive regula-
tion. 
Yet, how, then, does one move from these internal conventions to 
the regulation of in-group acts and relationships affecting out-group in-
terests? After all, what Durkheim describes here sounds like a prescrip-
tion for fragmentary, particular moralities, each rationalizing its actions 
to external queries by means of an internal logic. Ultimately, however, 
Durkheim will complicate this seemingly direct proposition. 
Each type of legal rule is “accompanied by a set of rules that are 
purely moral.”92 Penal law comes with a morality in common. 
Restitutory laws travel with little sets of moralities—one for each profes-
sion governed.93 But even where it looks as though society is spinning 
off into a million discrete moralities—to each group its own species of 
morals-plus-laws—this dispersal is restrained by another morality that 
keeps them together: “[e]very society is a moral society,” and each is 
united with a moral bond.94 Were this not so, we would be describing not 
a society but a mass of ever out-whirling fragments. Everywhere we look 
there is a separation, and everywhere a binding-together. 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 302; see also Romano, supra note 36, at 929–30, 935 (“Indeed, the spiritualism of an 
organic community is a central element in the corporatist vision. It binds the functionally specialized 
parts into a greater whole, ensuring the harmony of the system. The overriding goal is the destruction 
of politics, that is, the absorption of the political realm into the social, to achieve a unified society-
state, free of divisive conflict among groups.”). 
 89. DURKHEIM, supra note 87, at 313. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 172. 
 93. The concept of such self-governing moral spheres is, of course, more complicated than this 
description. 
 94. DURKHEIM, supra note 87, at 173. 
2016] Culture in Corporate Law 381 
It is in this manner that Durkheim’s Corporations95 were to act as a 
societal corrective. These groups were to be left to their own internal or-
ders because they had consciences, morals, or perhaps beliefs, that: ren-
dered them worthy of our trust that they would regulate themselves in 
morally “good” ways; and made competent external regulation of the 
group’s behavior both difficult and unnecessary. 
A common morality in the face of heterogeneous bits would be 
their hallmark—a morality arising not by fiat or by vote, but organical-
ly.96 Thus, despite opposition, Durkheim argued that the corporation’s 
heterogeneity in fact compelled it to be profoundly and constitutionally 
moral.97 
Having done this, however, Durkheim does a seeming about-face. 
He notes that leaving groups to their own moral devices, and thereby let-
ting each have its little duchy, will not result in individual freedom. “[I]t 
so happens,” Durkheim states (with an almost audible clearing-of-throat), 
“that liberty itself is the product of regulation.”98 According to Durk-
heim, relations in organic societies are increasingly modulated by means 
of restitutory rules. These may be positive rules dictating cooperation or 
rules giving rise to rights, both real and personal, that separate members’ 
interests in things. This set of juxtaposed rights gives individuals space 
and restrains the intrusion of one individual’s exercise of his freedoms 
into the freedoms of another. It keeps disputes from atomizing a society: 
good fences make good neighbors. This is negative solidarity—“not a 
true solidarity, but rather the negative aspects of every type of solidari-
ty,”99 an apparently necessary mirror image of organic solidarity. 
What Durkheim’s work reveals is the simultaneous difficulty and 
necessity of holding two views of regulation—and implicitly, two views 
of groupness—in tension. What comes first, the regulation-shunning, 
internally- and morally-ordered egg, or the law-loving chicken? 
The first condition for an entity to become coherent is for the parts 
that form it not to clash discordantly. But such an external harmony does 
not bring about cohesion. On the contrary, it presumes it. Negative soli-
darity is only possible where another kind is present, positive in nature, 
of which it is both the result and the condition.100 
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The legalistic chicken and the friendly egg continuously reposition 
themselves, and this eternal repositioning is necessary. This means that 
what looked like an aversion to regulation for Durkheim is actually an 
embrace of it as crucial. The markets should not be left completely to 
their own devices: a deficit in discipline surely leads to moral erosion.101 
Regulations and moralities are thus wound up into each other. 
If we take the chicken-and-egg nature of regulation and freedom to 
typify the conditions of the production of solidarity and cohesion within 
the modern corporation, what is cohering? What, in other words, is the 
shape of the entity thus formed, and who is included as making up that 
entity? Further, what does that mean for the nature of the corporation? At 
first glance, Durkheim appears to hold an image of group formation that 
is identical to Romano’s European societal corporatists102—but this is not 
so. According to Romano, an abiding feature of these corporatist views 
of group formation is that the harmony of the corporate group arises be-
cause “discordant interests are quelled by the development of communal 
ties.”103 Romano contrasts European societal corporatisms with that of 
Berle, using Huntington to buttress the claim that the atypical form taken 
by Berle’s corporatism (which, unlike Continental corporatisms, did not 
focus on corporatism as vanquisher of disharmony) was the result of the 
peculiar character of American nationalism. This American 
exceptionalism, Romano argued, “takes the form of a civil religion ex-
pressed in political, rather than cultural or territorial, ideals.”104 But this 
“corporatis[m] in the American grain” compares more closely to the con-
tinental corporatism of Durkheim with its necessitation of conflict.105 
Adolf Berle’s corporatism started out resembling that of Durkheim 
and, in later years, it only becomes more so. As in earlier times, Berle 
expects managers to hold within the corporation a function fundamental-
ly shaped by a concern for the good of society,106 positing a self-evident 
link between corporate effect on society and corporation as “social insti-
tution,” not one that is “private.” This link was sufficiently self-evident 
to allow Berle to say, in 1968, that the “[t]ransition of the large corpora-
tion from a private enterprise to a social institution has now been accom-
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plished and is generally recognized.”107 Berle does not mean “social in-
stitution” in the warm, fuzzy sense of today’s discourse on “corporate 
social responsibility.” He uses this term instead to refer to the over-
whelming power of corporations and the sheer size of their effect on so-
ciety, as well as the pure necessity, as a result, that they not be left to 
their own devices.108 
Berle further emphasizes the necessity of close and active state and 
societal oversight.109 The shape of society and the form that a good socie-
ty ought to take are, he stresses, necessarily the domain of these entities, 
not corporate structures: 
The corporate system of our time can do whatever in reason is 
asked of it in terms of production, expenditure of capital and distri-
bution of profit. But the corporate system cannot, should not and 
should not be expected to produce a society. It can and should con-
form to social requirements; it can and should lend help to govern-
ment and to quasi-public and other institutions whose task is to de-
velop a society both good and just. On the other hand, nothing in the 
structure of corporations or the training of their management entitles 
them to be philosophers.110 
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The corporate system of our time can do whatever in reason is asked of it in terms of pro-
duction, expenditure of capital and distribution of profit. But the corporate system cannot, 
should not and should not be expected to produce a society. It can and should conform to 
social requirements; it can and should lend help to government and to quasi-public and 
other institutions whose task is to develop a society both good and just. On the other 
hand, nothing in the structure of corporations or the training of their management entitles 
them to be philosophers. They can be held (as they were two generations ago) to an obli-
gation not to resist demands for betterment. They should be required to assist the social 
evolution as a democracy pounds out social principles, and as growing density of popula-
tion requires more rules of the road. Individuals, including those active in the corporate 
world as also individuals engaged in academics, politics and government can propose 
standards and measures and can campaign for them. Corporations can favor and protect 
their personnel in doing so. They can urge that better principles shall prevail and that bet-
ter road rules shall be made. They can even offer technical assistance in these processes. 
But there they must stop. Beyond that it seems to me they are subjects. Nothing in their 
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Commenting, supremely drolly, on the role of regulation (specifi-
cally, here, antitrust regulation) in economic life, he notes: “Factually, 
left to itself, the free market would not long exist.”111 Berle’s corporatist 
vision thus appears here to have shifted—slightly but significantly—to 
resemble that of Durkheim, stressing the necessity of controls external to 
the corporation—state, society—in addition to internal mores oriented 
toward supporting, or at least not “resisting,” those external ones.112 In 
Berle’s later corporatist vision, as in Durkheim’s early one, internal 
community and external regulatory forces work necessarily in concert to 
turn corporate behavior in the direction of the social weal. In the eyes of 
both, the regulatory environment is part of the alchemy of a corporation’s 
conscience and its solidarity—its personality. 
The following Part analyzes ethnographically how the interaction of 
law and group norms described by Berle and Durkheim arises in a      
real-life situation to shape the way a corporation is ascribed personal at-
tributes. 
III. A MĀORI-OWNED CORPORATION AND A MĀORI CORPORATION 
What makes a Christian corporation a Christian corporation? Or a 
Black corporation a Black corporation? The answer to these questions 
may resemble the answer to a similar sounding question that emerged in 
New Zealand and to which I turn in this Part: what makes a Māori corpo-
ration a Māori corporation, as opposed to a Māori-owned corporation? 
Part II described the lacunae the courts have left us with in determining 
what characteristics should be considered in future cases, and tendered 
two models of processes important in this determination. This Part of the 
Article describes the dynamics of cultural identification in the case of the 
New Zealand Māori-owned “Māori incorporation,”113 comparing these 
with the ways that, in the Contingent Corporation cases, corporations 
came to be adjudged to have political opinions, racial identities, and reli-
gious beliefs. I illustrate my argument by reference to examples drawn 
from my ethnographic research on Māori-owned corporations. This eth-
nographic data brings into view the processes by which cultural affilia-
tions may be ascribed to corporations. In other words, I examine what the 
                                                                                                             
present situation entitles them to govern, and if they try to take on that role, they are 
headed for trouble. 
Id. 
 111. Id. at 151. 
 112. See id. at 152. 
 113. While in the United States “incorporation” describes a process rather than a classification, 
the term’s usage in respect to the New Zealand Māori incorporation captures both of these aspects. 
See TTWMLA, infra note 115, § 247. 
2016] Culture in Corporate Law 385 
“Māori-ness” of Māori corporations can tell us about similar debates re-
garding personal attributes of corporations more broadly. 
Much in the way that there is no unitary, frozen “Māori Culture,” 
there is no such thing as a stable, categorical “Māori Corporation.” If, as 
I argue, there is something that might be called a Māori Corporation, it 
obtains that identity from some other source than the unilateral fiat of 
some powerful shareholder or management interest. Relatedly, while the 
law brings into being something called the “Māori incorporation,” this 
alone does not give the corporation some Māori identity cut from whole 
cloth. The Māori corporation is formed through the contingent, shifting 
interactions between Māori and non-Māori people, Māori histories, 
Māori-owned land, and the law of corporations; it is formed, that is, by 
means of a Durkheimian rendezvous between chicken and egg. 
A. The Indigenously Owned Corporation and the Indigenous             
Corporation 
At the northern end of New Zealand’s South Island, in a little city 
called Nelson, sit the headquarters for a corporation, Wakatū Incorpora-
tion, owned by Māori people of the area. A few years ago I was working 
in those headquarters with a friend of mine, a Māori man who is the gen-
eral manager of Wakatū. He daydreamed aloud to me about the future of 
his people and the business they owned. The corporation is a 
land-development company whose shareholders are members of four 
Māori tribes; my friend, Ropata, is one of its shareholders. We were 
planning a drafting session for the corporation’s long-term business plan, 
putting together briefing materials for the people who would be doing the 
drafting: projections of population, of pressing issues for the corporation 
(risks, for example, and burgeoning opportunities), of future industries—
diverse industries, but based, always, in the land of the area and its 
shores—and of different indicia for measuring progress on each front. 
In our planning meetings, every parameter we discussed as crucial 
to the corporation’s economic success was simultaneously and multiply 
framed in terms of the mana—the esteem, influence, or renown—of the 
shareholders of the corporation and their extended families.114 Legisla-
tion defines a Māori person as “a person of the Māori race of New Zea-
land” and “a descendant of any such a person.”115 But in Māori eyes, the 
operant idea is not the mere technical existence of such descent but the 
                                                 
 114. We are going to get a bit metaphysical here. Trust me; I’m an anthropologist. 
 115. Te Ture Whenua Māori Act/Māori Land Act § 4 1993 (N.Z.) [hereinafter TTWMLA], 
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0004/latest/DLM289897.html. 
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practice of whakapapa, genealogy: if you can recite your lineage back to 
a Māori ancestor, you are Māori. The people involved with Wakatū, from 
management to shareholders to employees, utilize the history of the an-
cestors of the tribes from which the shareholders hail in order to assert 
links of kinship between the whānau (the shareholders and their extended 
families) and the corporation. For Ropata, and for many of my interlocu-
tors, Wakatū is a corporation grown from the ground that holds the bones 
buried here of generations past, and from which generations to come will 
grow. These bones were the skeleton on which the body of the organiza-
tion was built, a body that was supported by the weaving of literal genea-
logical links between the corporation, the shareholders and their extend-
ed families, their ancestors, and the land. The long-term business plan 
looked to genealogical ties to suggest plans for a corporate body that ex-
tended out to the shareholders of generations past and generations to 
come. This, by the way, was a business plan for the next five hundred 
years. 
Wakatū is indeed a very particular sort of corporation, but it is not 
the only form a Māori-owned corporation might take. Although the term 
holds multiple meanings, what might be termed “Māori Companies” are 
generally regarded as Māori companies due either to their claiming the 
title or through the bare fact that the majority of their owners are Māori 
people or entities such as tribes, subtribes, or other Māori corporations.116 
These types of Māori companies are Māori businesses registered under 
the 1993 Companies Act—what might be considered the general legisla-
tion for business associations—and have the same duties and responsibil-
ities as any other New Zealand company founded under that Act.117 
But the characteristics that make forming a “Māori Company” a 
practical option for specific types of Māori business present a certain set 
of difficulties for other types of business. The structures and politics of 
tribes and subtribes are sometimes incompatible with the individually 
                                                 
 116. See generally Mason Durie, Universal Provision, Indigeneity and the Treaty of Waitangi, 
in ROLES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR IVOR RICHARDSON 167 (Da-
vid Carter & Matthew Palmer eds., 2002); GARTH HARMSWORTH, REPORT ON THE INCORPORATION 
OF TRADITIONAL VALUES/TIKANGA INTO CONTEMPORARY MĀORI BUSINESS ORGANISATION AND 
PROCESS (2005), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.452.7226 
&rep=rep1&type=pdf; HEI WHAKATINANA I TE TŪRUA PŌ, BUSINESS SUCCESS AND MĀORI 
ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE MANAGEMENT STUDY (2003); TE PUNI KŌKIRI, THE MĀORI 
ECONOMY (2012), available at http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/a-matou-mohiotanga/business-and-
economics/the-maori-economy. From this point on in the Article, I use the term “company” to indi-
cate business associations under the ambit of the Companies Act. 
 117. Companies Act 1993, Public Act No. 105 (N.Z.); see also Te Puni Kōkiri, Whakamahia: 
Support, Information, and Opportunities (July 11, 2014), www.tpk.govt.nz/mi/whakamahia/ 
effective-governance/what-is-governance/company/. 
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focused nature of corporate shareholding. Even setting aside the focus 
upon individually determined benefits generally integral to the structure 
of stock companies, cultural or societal priorities might still go unrecog-
nized in the context of the company. These issues will loom large for 
groups whose main asset base is communally owned Māori land. The 
people who are of the tribes and subtribes affiliated with that land, or 
whose families have owned that land or had traditional authority over it 
for generations, might have particular feelings about its management. If 
they were to incorporate their interests in this land, the corporation’s 
shareholders—the land’s erstwhile owners—might prefer to think of 
themselves as owners of land rather than merely of shares of stock. Fur-
ther, they might not look kindly upon managers taking risks—even mere-
ly the risks common to business—that might lead to the loss of land; and 
they might disapprove of management taking on operations that would 
affiliate the people underlying the company with unsavory business deal-
ings. Having tribes or subtribes—communal groups with strongly felt 
social priorities—as shareholders might present still other difficulties. 
In acknowledgement of these types of Māori interests, the Māori 
Land Act articulates pronounced concern with how land communally 
owned by Māori ought to be protected from alienation (and thus the gov-
ernment protected from further shame). Thus, New Zealand has a set of 
institutions in place for the incorporation of interests in such land. These 
institutions include a variety of types of organizations primarily under 
the ambit of the Te Ture Whenau Māori/Māori Land Act 1993 
(TTWMLA or Māori Land Act). Passed in the wake of an enormous set-
tlement relating to Māori grievances with the Crown, and the sudden at-
tention this settlement brought to Māori land and money,118 the Māori 
Land Act clarified the obligations and distinctions of the land-based 
“Māori incorporation,” as well as a variety of types of land-based 
trusts.119 It also promulgated protections meant to address the idiosyncra-
                                                 
 118. This settlement was the 1992 “Sealord settlement,” which compensated Māori people for 
the government’s breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi in constructing its fisheries conservation 
scheme. 
 119. TTWMLA, supra note 115, §§ 246–284. The trusts under the 1993 Māori Land Act—
Māori Land Court Trusts—tend to differ from Māori incorporations in a number of ways, but most 
particularly in their (relative) unsuitability for high risk/high reward business. There are several 
types of these trusts; out of all of these, the variety called the Ahu Whenua trust is the most amena-
ble to commerce. Like all of the Māori Land Court Trusts, however, Ahu Whenua are quite limited 
in terms of their risk-taking, management, and alienation of land. Id. § 210–221. For instance, de-
spite their restriction in contrast to Companies Act enterprises, Māori incorporations do have consid-
erable freedom to exercise their business judgment. The law requires greater duty of care on the part 
of trustees, a demand that will necessarily make the trust form less suited to risky (and thus putative-
ly very profitable) ventures. Id. § 223. Māori incorporations, on the other hand, are encouraged to 
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sies I have described with regard to communal land ownership. The 
Māori Land Court has a close rein on all of these land-based entities, and 
the beneficiaries or shareholders (who, specifically for the reasons I out-
lined above, are generally called “owners”) are extremely involved in the 
way each is run.120 
Although they have more freedom to undertake commercial activi-
ties than do the trusts founded under TTWMLA, Māori incorporations 
like Wakatū are nonetheless very closely regulated in terms of what they 
can do with Māori-owned land.121 As is the case with all of these 
TTWMLA organizations, the protections put into place by the Act to 
secure the interests of the beneficial owners of Māori land against aliena-
tion make it more difficult for boards to secure approval for the sale of 
land and (not altogether coincidentally) more difficult to conduct busi-
ness at a profit. Among other restrictions, the Māori incorporation must 
hold on to a certain amount of land at all times, and in order to sell any 
portion of Māori land, the board must gain approval for the sale by a 
special resolution passed by those holding 75 percent of the incorpora-
tion’s shares.122 
There are other external pressures placed on the directors and the 
management in terms of fiduciary expectations. In contrast to duties of 
directors of other companies, the duties of directors of Māori incorpora-
tions (and the courts’ standards for the determination of the breach of 
those duties) are remarkably vague.123 The Act’s primary priority is to 
limit the alienation of Māori land;124 there is an argument that might be 
made that the provisions for directors’ responsibilities, and the courts’ 
                                                                                                             
take on at least moderate risk; bad outcomes of this behavior do not subject the incorporation to 
actions in breach of trust: “No Māori incorporation acting in accordance with its powers and in com-
pliance with this Act or any other Act shall be in breach of trust.” Id. § 250(5). 
 120. See, e.g., id. §§ 151–68, 246–84. 
 121. Consonant with the focus of most New Zealand business, Māori enterprise tends to con-
centrate mainly on primary production—forestry, agriculture, fishing, and land management. TE 
PUNI KŌKIRI, ANNUAL REPORT: FOR YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 2015, at 33 (2005), available at 
www.tpk.govt.nz/mi/a-matou-mohiotanga/. This is especially true of Māori incorporations: while it 
is not strictly required by law, their operations will concentrate on land-based activities as their asset 
bases are generally focused on land that they cannot easily exchange for other assets. As a result of 
the Sealord settlement, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, and the vesting in Māori of fish-
ing quota, some Māori businesses are also well placed to involve themselves in seafood enterprises 
of various types. Wakatū, for instance, has on several occasions partnered with the Sealord Company 
(which remains under Māori ownership) to undertake fishery ventures. 
 122. TTWMLA, supra note 119, § 150B. 
 123. See Companies Act, Public Act No. 105, § 128; TTWMLA, supra note 115, § 269; see 
also Opawa Rangitoto 2C Incorporation [2004] NZMLC 53; Bramley v Hiruharama ponui Inc – 
Committee of Management [2006] NZMAC 27. 
 124. TTWMLA, supra note 115, § 2. 
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explication of their breach, are so vague precisely because the Māori 
Land Court has such an involved role in the conduct of Māori incorpora-
tions. In addition to being involved with directors’ decisions regarding 
land use, the court has enormous freedom to choose and replace direc-
tors;125 the close, but capricious, scrutiny by the courts might explain 
Māori incorporation directors’ propriety in terms of seeking shareholder 
approval for incorporations’ ventures. 
Māori corporations under the 1993 Companies Act (standard com-
panies owned by Māori) and Māori corporations under the Māori Land 
Act (Māori incorporations) are separate legal entities from their share-
holders, entities with a putatively perpetual lifespan. Despite this similar-
ity, however, there are some slight but important differences in the tem-
poral orientations of the two. That directors’ obligations under the Com-
panies Act are laid out in detail does not necessarily result in restraining 
company directors more than Māori Land Act corporation directors; in-
stead, the Companies Act restrictions act as a long leash, giving Compa-
nies Act directors considerably more freedom to take risks than have 
Māori Land Act directors. This means that, speaking even merely in 
terms of legal structuring, the focus of the Māori incorporation will tend 
to be much more long-term than that of the company. 
The protective posture the government takes against the alienation 
of Māori land means that those whose main asset is communally owned 
Māori land, and who wish to form a commercial corporation, will neces-
sarily form a Māori incorporation. In addition to protecting Māori land 
from alienation (which would include shielding it from risky ventures), 
one of the primary purposes underlying the conduct of the Māori incor-
poration is to allow some commercial flexibility (that is to say, risk). 
Māori incorporations can risk more of their assets than trusts can. As 
compared against other entities formed over Māori land, the Māori in-
corporation is a veritable capitalist playground. 
Māori incorporations thus constantly negotiate—and I argue, are 
constituted by—this balancing act between profit and social responsibil-
ity. The varied ways in which New Zealanders understand this concate-
nation of freedoms and protections give rise to an ideation of the rela-
tionship between the corporation and the land not as one of mere man-
agement for profit, but as guardianship of the land.126 The meaning of 
this role is constantly debated among directors, managers, employees, 
                                                 
 125. Id. §§ 269, 280. 
 126. Gwendolyn Gordon, Whanaungatanga: We Are a Family Business, in Bones, Breath, 
Body: The Life of an Indigenously Owned Corporation 162 (Nov. 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
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shareholders, and other stakeholders alike. To what extent should the 
corporation be responsible for the economic, social, and cultural devel-
opment of its shareholders and their extended families, or of Māori peo-
ple in general (or even more generally, the well-being of society)? What 
forms should that responsibility take? What is the shape of the constitu-
encies to which the corporation is responsible?127 
The ways in which Māori commercial activity and its relation to in-
digenous authenticity are imagined in New Zealand society are important 
factors in the institution of the legal and economic changes I have de-
scribed and in the outcomes of these changes for Māori people. For the 
Māori incorporation, perceptions of legitimacy rest on what looks like a 
paradox: to be successful, these corporations need to be “fully corpo-
rate,” yet simultaneously “authentically traditional.” By “fully corpo-
rate,” I mean that these organizations work against a background of 
high-profile Māori business failures commonly read as indications that 
Māori are bad at business; against a supposition that Māori political 
complexities hobble Māori enterprise from the outset; against, that is, a 
suspicion “that tribal politics interferes with market efficiency.”128 In the 
face of this settler nation’s “structures of expectation”129 regarding the 
incompatibility of indigeniety and capitalist enterprise, Māori businesses 
must be exceedingly careful to project an image of prudence and profes-
sionalism. By “authentically traditional,” I mean that Māori involved 
with running businesses also fight a supposition that engagement with 
capitalist enterprise disqualifies or at least reduces them in terms of 
Māori identity.130 Whether they are very successful or less so, Māori 
companies must constantly negotiate this needle’s eye of inside and out-
side, difference and similarity. 
B. The Indigenous Corporation and the Contingent Corporation 
Carnell and Hobby Lobby build upon Citizens United’s simplifica-
tion of the analysis of corporate rights. In these cases, the corporation 
                                                 
 127. Gwendolyn Gordon, Introduction: Agnostic Anthropologies of the Corporation, in Bones, 
Breath, Body: The Life of an Indigenously Owned Corporation 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 128. Jessica R. Cattelino, One Hamburger at a Time: Revisiting the State-Society Divide with 
the Seminole Tribe of Florida and Hard Rock International, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S137, 
S142 (2011). 
 129. Jessica R. Cattelino, The Double Bind of American Indian Need-Based Sovereignty, 25 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 235, 235 (2010).  
 130. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rata, Encircling the Commons: Neotribal Capitalism in New Zealand 
Since 2000, 11 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 327, 327–53 (2011); Annette Sykes, Bruce Jesson 
Foundation Lecture: The Politics of the Brown Table, (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://news.tangatawhenua.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Annette_Sykes_Lecture_2010.pdf. 
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begins to resemble the corporatist conception of the corporation’s nature 
popular at the beginning of the last century. Missing, however, and sev-
ering the resemblance, is that the new analysis lacks the thoughtfulness 
and attention to social consequences of the previous one. This omission 
arises directly from the simplification of the analysis the court embraces. 
Zephyr Teachout has argued that the notions of corporate free 
speech and group decision-making—as demonstrated in the reasoning of 
the Citizens United opinion—came into being out of the disjuncture be-
tween the last-century Court’s attentiveness to wriggly, messy, real-life 
issues in cases and the modern Court’s concern with bright-line rules.131 
It is, perhaps, an inverse iron cage: the modern Court keeps the rhetorical 
trappings of the past but discards the attentiveness to context and contin-
gency to link this past to lived life.132 In a similar light, I suggest that  
these new, socially complex developments in corporate law, with the 
societal stakes that are becoming apparent, entreat scholars to ask the 
kinds of questions that can engage this more complex notion of culture. 
How might analysis like that modeled in the previous Part change 
our way of examining corporations—and of imagining the corporation as 
a rights-holder? The parallels between the Māori incorporation and the 
idea of the corporation elaborated in Carnell and Hobby Lobby may not 
be immediately apparent, but they are there nonetheless. The leaders of 
the Māori incorporation, tasked with the stewardship of Māori-owned 
land, will necessarily negotiate the corporation’s status with regard to its 
indigenous shareholders and the often culturally important land that is 
the center of their asset base—that is, they will negotiate the corpora-
tion’s cultural identity. The Māori incorporation thus bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the Contingent Corporation. 
What makes the Wakatū 500-year business plan thinkable is the 
idea of the corporate body as somehow coterminous with a particular set 
of tribes and their history, or with a set of values extending down through 
the tribes’ histories. During the year and a half I spent interviewing, 
shadowing, and becoming involved in the lives of the managers, board 
members, and shareholders of the corporation, the importance of a cer-
tain set of questions became clear: for example, questions of what “self-
                                                 
 131. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How 
Anarchists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 163 (2011). 
 132. “Reading the corruption and political speech cases of the mid-twentieth century is like 
watching a shawl gradually fall off of a woman’s shoulders onto the floor during a concert. The old 
ideas about corruption are not so much thrown out as misplaced and then forgotten—such that by the 
time the twenty-first century comes around, and the shawl is again needed, one doesn’t even know 
where to begin to look.” Id. at 166. 
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image” the whānau—the corporation’s shareholders and their extended 
family—projects upon the corporation when the two are, discursively, 
made coterminous; and questions of how images of the model whānau-
member—its responsibilities, its rights, its connection to land—get 
wrapped up in management’s ideation and presentation of the corpora-
tion to the public at large, and are then projected back to the whānau. 
The histories, stories, legends, and sayings deepen or limit the relation-
ship between the corporation and the tribes to which its shareholders be-
long. All of these factors become part of how Wakatū and its sharehold-
ers continuously negotiate the dance that indigenously owned enterprises 
must perform133 as they strive to simultaneously maintain business legit-
imacy (“strategic plan!”) and indigenous bona fides (“500 years!”)—a 
dance that often seems paradoxical to outsiders.134 Tying the activities of 
the business to the history of its affiliated tribes is utterly crucial to this 
enterprise. 
People involved with the corporation become invested in policing 
the boundaries of the relationships between the corporation, the tribes, 
and the shareholders because what is at stake is, at its root, an ontological 
question: what is an indigenous—but not indigenously owned—
corporation? People remake the corporation in their own (very complex) 
image as an intending subject, transforming it into what is held to be an 
ethically accountable thing. Further, the people involved in running the 
corporation construct themselves as ethically accountable people in light 
of their agency (or lack of agency) in shaping the way the corporation 
acts in the world. The Māori incorporation might, therefore, be consid-
ered to be bound as much by social and cultural demands as it is by regu-
latory ones. 
But there are some characteristics of the Māori incorporation, 
which do not exist in the Contingent Corporation, that are of particular 
salience here. In a Māori incorporation, entity status is assumed, while 
personhood is not. Orts makes an argument for an institutionalist theory 
of the firm by powerfully articulating the benefits of the continued rele-
vance of the corporate personhood concept.135 This argument makes 
                                                 
 133. See generally ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, THE CUNNING OF RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS 
ALTERITIES AND THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM (2002). 
 134. See generally Beth A. Conklin, Shamans Versus Pirates in the Amazonian Treasure 
Chest, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1050 (2002); Beth A. Conklin & Laura R. Graham, The Shifting 
Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and Eco-Politics, 97 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 695 (1995); Susan 
E. Cook, The Business of Being Bafokeng, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S151 (2011); Elizabeth A. 
Povinelli, Consuming Geist: Popontology and the Spirit of Capital in Indigenous Australia, 12 PUB. 
CULTURE 501 (2000); POVINELLI, supra note 133. 
 135. See ORTS, supra note 38. 
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sense conceptually, but leaves open the question of whether the person-
hood concept needs to be retained, and, as Orts acknowledges, it leaves 
open the question of whether it should be.136 The absence of corporate 
personhood in jurisdictions such as New Zealand demonstrates that the 
“person” idea is not a necessary one; “entity” serves the same purposes 
for conducting business and being held liable for harms.137 The differ-
ence matters because of the way that folk understandings of personhood 
become increasingly wound into jurists’ delineations of the character of 
corporations and the rights that may properly be seen to be due to them. 
The embrace of “entity” terminology might help discard the metaphori-
cal baggage that has made it so easy for corporate power enthusiasts to 
extend the constitutional rights of the corporation. An institutional theory 
of the corporation does not require the legal category of the corporate 
person.138 
The New Zealand Māori incorporation is something separate—it is 
an entity with its own interests—but it is also connected to the values of 
this community. Its nature as an “indigenous corporation” (as opposed to 
just “Māori incorporation” or “indigenously owned corporation”) comes 
neither through its status as person nor through the values, rights, and 
interests of its individual shareholders transduced magically into it, à la 
the Contingent Corporation. The “indigeniety” of the corporation is pos-
sible as much because of the strict regulations put upon the corporation 
by the state as it is the traditions and priorities of the people. 
The same might be said to be true for a Black corporation, a Catho-
lic corporation, or a Jewish corporation in the United States. To the ex-
tent each of these corporations may meaningfully be said to possess these 
attributes, it is made so not merely by courts’ imprimatur or by a unilat-
eral decision from its controlling shareholders, but by processes such as 
those I outline in the case of New Zealand Māori incorporation. Personal 
attributes of controlling stockholders or managers may factor in, but so 
will the norms and expectations of workers, lenders, customers, the rele-
vant community, and other constituencies. Law will matter too. For ex-
ample, the specifics of state corporate law will be one of many factors 
held in tension. Law will shape the social characteristics of the corpora-
                                                 
 136. Id. at 18–19. 
 137. The main thrust of Orts’s argument is against aggregate views of the firm—his emphasis 
is upon demonstrating that the firm has ontological (as well as imagined) reality as person or entity, 
not deciding which of the two terms is better to use. See id. 
 138. On the other hand, some type of entity status does appear to be crucial, or at least is so 
useful as to have been corralled by progressives since at least Dodd’s 1932 discourse with Berle, in 
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tion—but the meaning of corporate personal characteristics in relation to 
the law will come from these contextual factors. 
In short, what I seek to emphasize here is a cultural conception of 
the corporation, embracing its radical heterogeneity. Rather than being a 
“solid” body that may be conceived of in direct analogy to an individual, 
the corporation is “particulate” and particular. I have thus aimed to un-
derline the way the corporation is constructed of junctures that disassem-
ble and assemble themselves at every moment in time.139 This friction, 
this tension, is productive for the corporation. It is a process of what 
some philosophers would call “being-at-work-staying-itself”: the thing is 
made real—“stable”—by means of this constant internal tension.140 
CONCLUSION: THE LIVING CORPORATION 
Sociologist Philip Abrams once noted a curious problem in under-
taking scholarship in regard to the state. The difficulty of studying the 
state, it seemed, was that scholars, while disaggregating the concept in 
their theorizing, found it necessary in practice to act as if it were a 
bounded, agentive, solid thing.141 Anthropologists have similarly dis-
cussed this situation through scholarly discourse in regard to the corpora-
tion: failing to demystify it, we tend to see it only as smooth, 
all-powerful, and unknowable.142 
It thus becomes easy to imagine corporate cultural characteristics as 
analogous to the personal characteristics of an individual. The cases I 
have outlined reveal this assumption, but the courts leave untheorized its 
motivations. The vision of the corporation thus enacted echoes versions 
of an early twentieth-century corporatism characterized by viewing the 
corporation as necessarily imbued with the spiritual or moral character of 
the human community involved with it. As the work of Adolf Berle and 
Émile Durkheim reminds us, however, the generation of corporate per-
sonal characteristics is a complex process. 
To understand them, you have to get down to the bones and the 
body and the breath of things: to the way people imagine agency and 
personality, the way they imagine history, and the way people imagine 
the boundaries and shape of the corporation. Opening this particular 
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black box143 to reveal the fluid nature of the corporation requires an un-
derstanding of the way people undertake the reinscription of boundaries 
between persons and things, and the establishment and cutting of new 
tendrils of networks144 so that, in Eric Hirsch’s words, “a singular identi-
ty can be effected.”145 
I have outlined a modern anthropological concept of culture charac-
terized by attention to process and movement. Approaching the corpora-
tion in this anthropological way allows us to see the meaning-laden con-
tingency of these organizations and the grounded processes by which 
they are shaped into different types of responsibility-holding entities. 
What might we do with this approach? 
The Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby leaves us to work out what it 
means for future cases. What characteristics make a corporation a proper 
subject of the ascription of personal rights? In deciphering this question, 
other analyses might have us focus upon, for example, the official corpo-
rate values promulgated by the corporation’s leadership. The modern 
cultural anthropological analysis I articulate will chiefly concern itself 
with formless and directionless, yet productive, tensions, such as those 
described in Part III. An analysis of the cultural character of the corpora-
tion focusing on unilateral edicts or official stances would likely miss 
that simmering Durkheimian froth of mores, ideas, tendencies, judg-
ments, and moralities coming from the top of the organization, from the 
bottom, and from all sorts of elsewheres.146 
The Court of today seeks clarity and a general applicability in un-
dertaking its analysis and in constructing its opinions—a fine goal. But in 
relation to the personal rights cases, a deeper analysis is necessary. If 
corporations are going to be naturalized in the manner in which these 
cases demonstrate, we need to pay very thoughtful attention to the na-
ture, context, and character of the corporations and the rights at issue in 
order to discern the proper terms of these personal rights extended to 
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them. We must get into just those messy details and questions of context 
that the Court has sought to avoid. 
The stakes here are high. Cultural theory does not merely allow us 
to describe more accurately the life and the law of corporations; it also 
contains normative implications. The Supreme Court’s simplified con-
ceptualization of corporations supports doctrine that hurts important hu-
man interests, obscuring or enervating what should be rich conversations 
about heterogeneity, responsibility, and the admixture of business and 
social values. Serious attention to cultural analysis within corporate law 
will help us to identify better legal rules and build better institutions. 
